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Abstract: This paper suggests a model for the motion of tagged pedestrians: pedestrians
moving towards a specified targeted destination, which they are forced to reach. It aims to
be a decision-making tool for the positioning of fire fighters, security personnel and other
services in a pedestrian environment. Taking interaction with the surrounding crowd into
account leads to a differential nonzero-sum game model where the tagged pedestrians
compete with the surrounding crowd of ordinary pedestrians. When deciding how to
act, pedestrians consider crowd distribution-dependent effects, like congestion and crowd
aversion. Including such effects in the parameters of the game, makes it a mean-field type
game. The equilibrium control is characterized, and special cases are discussed. Behavior
in the model is studied by numerical simulations.
MSC 2010: 49N90, 49J55, 60H10, 60K30, 91A80, 93E20
Keywords: pedestrian dynamics; backward-forward stochastic differential equa-
tions; mean-field type games; congestion; crowd aversion; evacuation planning
1. Introduction
Tagged pedestrians are individuals that plan their motion from an unspecified initial position
in order to reach a specified target location in a certain time. The model for tagged pedestrian
motion proposed in this paper is based on mean-field type game theory, and is a decision
making tool for the positioning of fire fighters, medical personnel, etc, during mass gatherings.
The tagged’s prime objective is the pre-set final destination which is considered essential to
reach; ending up in proximity of the final destination is not acceptable, it has to be reached.
This is in sharp contrast to the standard finite-horizon models cited below, where pedestri-
ans are penalized if their final position deviates from a target position, such penalization is a
’soft’ constraint and can be broken at a cost. The tagged’s initial position is chosen rationally.
Therefore, we are inclined to think of the tagged as external entities to be deployed in the
crowd. Where they (rationally) ought to be deployed is subject to an offline calculation made
by a coordinator: a central planner. Besides tagged pedestrian motion, possible applications of
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the model include cancer cell dynamics and smart medicine in the human body, and malware
propagation in a network, among other.
The central planner’s decision making is based on knowledge of the pedestrian distribution. As
noted in [45], the pedestrian behavior in dense crowds is empirically random to some extent,
likely due to the large number of external inputs. In a noisy environment, the central planner
anticipates the behavior of the crowd and predicts the tagged’s path to the target. As is stan-
dard in the mean-field approach, interaction with tagged and ordinary pedestrians is modeled
as reactions to the state distribution of a representative tagged and ordinary pedestrian, re-
spectively. This leads us to formulate a mean-field type game based model, which in certain
scenarios reduces to an optimal control based model.
1.1. Related work
1.1.1. Optimal control and games of mean-field type
Rational pedestrian behavior is, in this paper, characterized by either a game equilibrium,
or an optimal control. The tool used to find the equilibrium/optimal behavior is Pontrya-
gin’s stochastic maximum principle (SMP). For stochastic control problems, SMP yields, when
available, necessary conditions that must be satisfied by any optimal solution. The necessary
conditions become sufficient under additional convexity conditions. Early results show that an
optimal control along with the corresponding optimal state trajectory must solve the so-called
Hamiltonian system, which is a two-point (forward-backward) boundary value problem, to-
gether with a maximum condition of the so-called Hamiltonian function (see [51] for a detailed
account). In stochastic differential games, both zero-sum and nonzero-sum, SMP is one of the
main tools for obtaining conditions for an equilibrium, essentially inherited from the theory
of stochastic optimal control. For recent examples of the use of SMP in stochastic differential
game theory, see [43, 4].
In stochastic systems, the backward equation is fundamentally different from the forward equa-
tion, if the solution is required to be adapted. An adapted solution to a backward stochastic
differential equation (BSDE) is a pair of adapted stochastic processes (Y·, Z·), where Z· cor-
rects any “non-adaptedness” caused by the terminal condition of Y·. As pointed out in [38],
the first component Y· corresponds to the mean evolution of the dynamics, and Z· to the
risk between current time and terminal time. Linear BSDEs extend to non-linear BSDEs [46]
and backward-forward SDEs (BFSDE) [3, 31]. BSDEs with distribution-dependent coefficients,
mean-field BSDEs, are by now well-understood objects [12, 14]. Mean-field BFSDEs arise natu-
rally in the probabilistic analysis of mean-field games (MFG), mean-field type games (MFTG)
and optimal control of mean-field type equations.
The theory of optimal control of mean-field SDEs, initiated in [2], treats stochastic control prob-
lems with coefficients dependent on the marginal state-distribution. This theory is by now well
developed for forward stochastic dynamics, i.e., with initial conditions on state [10, 26, 13, 19].
With SMPs for optimal control problems of mean-field type at hand, MFTG theory can inherit
these techniques, just like stochastic differential game theory does in the mean-field free case.
See [47] for a review of solution approaches to MFTGs.
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Optimal control of mean-field BSDEs has recently gained attention. In [42] the mean-field LQ
BSDE control problem with deterministic coefficients is studied. Assuming the control space
is linear, linear perturbation is used to derive a stationarity condition which together with a
mean-field FBSDE system characterizes the optimal control. Other recent work on the control
of mean-field BSDEs makes use of the SMP approach of [50] to control of BFSDEs.
Optimal control problems of mean-field type can be interpreted as large population limits of
cooperative games, where the players collaborate to optimize a joint objective [40]. A close
relative to mean-field type control is MFG, a class of non-cooperative stochastic differential
games, initiated by [34] and [41] independently. For both mean-field type control problems and
MFG, the games approximated are games between a large number of indistinguishable (anony-
mous) players, interacting weakly through a mean-field coupling term. Weak player-to-player
interaction through the mean-field coupling restricts the influence one player has on any other
player to be inversely proportional to the number of players, hence the level of influence of any
specific player is very small. In contrast to the MFG, players in a MFTG can be influential,
and distinguishable (non-anonymous). That is, state dynamics and/or cost need not be of the
same form over the whole player population, and a single player can have a major influence on
other players’ dynamics and/or cost.
1.1.2. Pedestrian crowd modeling
There is a variety of mathematical approaches to the modeling of pedestrian crowd motion.
Microscopic force-based models [29, 20], and in particular the social force model, represent
pedestrian behavior as a reaction to forces and potentials, applied not only by the surrounding
environment but also by the pedestrian’s internal motivation and desire. A cellular automata
approach to microscopic modeling of pedestrian crowds can be found in [17, 37, 36], to mention
only few. Macroscopic models view the crowd as a continuum, described by averaged quanti-
ties such as density and pressure. The Hughes model [35, 33, 48] couples a conservation law,
representing the physics of the crowd, with an Eikonal equation modeling a common task of
the pedestrians. Its variations are manifold. Kinetic and other multi-scale models [7, 22, 6]
constitute an intermediate step between the micro- and the macro scales. Microscopic game
and optimal control models for pedestrian crowd dynamics, with their relevant continuum lim-
its in the form of mean-field games and mean-field type optimal control, have gained interest in
the last decade. In [30], a simplified MFG was used to model rational behavior of pedestrian
in a crowd. Following Lasry and Lion’s paper on MFG, [27] applied MFG to pedestrian crowd
motion and [39] used MFG to model local congestion effects, i.e. the relationship between en-
ergy needed to walk/run and local crowd density. MFG based models have also been used to
simulate evacuation of pedestrians [15, 16, 25].
The mean-field approach rests on an exchangeability assumption; pedestrians are anonymous,
they may have different paths but one individual cannot be distinguished from another. While
interesting when modeling circumstances where pedestrians can be considered indistinguish-
able, for instance a train station during rush hour or fast exits of an area in case of an alarm,
there are situations where an anonymous crowd model is not satisfactory. Mean-field type
games is a tool to extend the mean-field approach to distinguishable sub-crowds and influential
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individuals, and was applied in [5]. Other ways to break the anonymity within the mean-field
approach are multi-population MFGs [28, 21, 1] and major agent models [32, and references
therein].
Another important characteristic of standard MFGs and MFTGs is the assumption of anticipa-
tive players. Each player is assumed to predict how the whole population will act in the future,
and then pick a strategy accordingly. In a pedestrian crowd setting, this would correspond to
pedestrians knowing, most likely by experience, how the surrounding crowd will behave. This
is a very high ’level of rationality’, and certainly not appropriate in all scenarios. We refer to
[23] for a precise discussion on the level of rationality of pedestrian crowd models, including
mean-field games and optimal control of mean-field type based models.
1.2. Paper contribution and outline
This paper investigates a new modeling approach to the motion of pedestrians whose primary
objective is to reach a specific target, at a specific time. The model can represent a large group
that is steered by a central planner, or a single individual. Even though these pedestrians have
certain non-standard goals, they are constrained by the same physical limitations as ordinary
pedestrians, and the central planner takes this into consideration. Moreover, the central plan-
ner has access to complete information of the surrounding environment, and utilizes it in the
decision making process.
The contribution of this paper is a mean-field type game based model for the motion of tagged
pedestrians in a surrounding crowd of ’ordinary pedestrians’. The players in the game are
crowds, and act under general distribution-dependent dynamics and cost. The tagged pedes-
trians have a ’hard’ terminal condition, while the ordinary pedestrians have a ’hard’ initial
condition, and this results in a state equation in the form of a mean-field BFSDE, representing
i) the predicted motion of the tagged towards the target, coupled with ii) the evolution of the
surrounding crowd from a known initial configuration.
Rational behavior in the model is characterized with a version of SMP, tailored for the mean-
field BFSDE system with mean-field type costs. The central section of this paper is the solved
examples, where we illustrate pedestrian behavior in the model. Further directions of research
are also outlined.
The tagged pedestrian model is presented in Section 2, which begins in a deterministic setting,
to which we gradually add components until the full model is reached. The SMP that gives
necessary and sufficient conditions for a pair of equilibrium controls for the mean-field type
game is presented in Theorem 2.1. Examples of tagged motion are studied in Section 3. All
technical proofs and background theory are moved to the appendix.
2. The tagged pedestrian model
In this section the tagged pedestrian model is introduced. Velocity fields are the driving com-
ponents in the model and include both small-scale pedestrian interactions and path planning
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components. The latter is implemented by pedestrians in a rational way: A cost functional
summarizing pedestrian preferences is minimized. The former describes involuntary movement
over which the pedestrian has no control.
List of symbols
T ∈ (0.∞) – the time horizon.
(Ω,F ,F,P) – the underlying filtered probability space.
P(Rd) – the space of probability measures on (Rd,B(Rd)).
P2(Rd) – all square-integrable measures in P(Rd).
L (X) ∈ P(Rk) – the distribution of the random variable X ∈ Rk under P.
X· – the stochastic process {Xt; t ≥ 0}.
L2F (Rd) – the space of F-measurable square-integrable Rd-valued random variables.
2.1. Pedestrian dynamics
In a deterministic setting pedestrian state dynamics are described by ordinary differential
equations (ODE). An ordinary pedestrian is initiated at some location x0 ∈ Rd, and moves
according to an ODE with an initial condition,{
d
dtXt = b
x
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
X0 = x0.
(2.1)
The pedestrian influences its velocity through a control function, ux· . The control is assumed
to take values in the set Ux ⊂ Rdx , dx ≥ 1. Alongside the control function, bxt may depend
on interaction with other pedestrians, for example through collisions. In the literature, the
velocity is often split into a behavioral velocity (the control) and an interaction velocity,
bxt = u
x
t + b
x,int
t . (2.2)
So on top of any interaction velocity the tagged influences its movement through a control, and
this grants it some smartness. As was discussed in the introduction, the pedestrian may foresee
crowd movement and act in advance to avoid congested areas and other obstacles. Pedestrian
models that considers the behavioral velocity to be an internal choice of the pedestrian leaves
the framework of classical particle models and enters decision-based smart models. A summary
of the difference between these model classes is found in [45]. Alongside ordinary pedestrians,
tagged pedestrians are deployed. They represent a person on a mission, who has to reach a target
location yT ∈ Rd at time t = T . In the deterministic setting, the tagged moves according to
an ODE with terminal condition,{
d
dtYt = u
y
t + b
y,int
t , t ∈ [0, T ], uyt ∈ Uy ⊂ Rdy , dy ≥ 1,
YT = yT .
(2.3)
Just like ux· influences the terminal position of an ordinary pedestrian, so does u
y
· influence
the initial position of a tagged pedestrian. This should be interpreted in the following way: the
Aurell, Djehiche/Tagged pedestrian model 6
initial position of the tagged pedestrian is not pre-determined, but depends on the pedestrian’s
choice of behavioral velocity. This choice is subject to the terminal condition, and at the same
time it adheres to other preferences. For example, if there is a high risk of injury at a certain
location yT (doors, stairs, etc.), where is the best spot for a medic to be positioned, so that
she can reach yT in time T? Certainly not at yT , since it is a high risk area. The medic’s initial
location is preferably a safe spot, from which it is easy for her to access yT , taking surrounding
pedestrians and environment into account. This is what should be reflected in the choice of uy· .
Pedestrian motion can be considered deterministic if the crowd is sparse, but partially random
if the crowd is dense. To capture this, (2.1)-(2.3) is extended to its stochastic counterpart. Let
(Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability space, endowed with the filtration F = (Ft)t≥0, satisfying
the usual conditions. Let the space carry Bx· and B
y
· , independent wx- and wy-dimensional
F-Wiener processes, and a random variable yT ∈ L2FT (Rd) independent of B· := (Bx· , B
y
· )∗.
The Brownian motion B· is split into Bx· and B
y
· to emphasize modeling features: Bx· is the
noise that explicitly effects the ordinary pedestrians diffusion, while By· may be used to model
any noise that in addition to Bx· effects the tagged. All information in the model up to time t is
contained in Ft, and a process that depends only on past and current information is called an
Ft-adapted process. It is natural to require pedestrian motion to be adapted, since pedestrians
react causally to the environment. In this random environment, we consider a control to be
feasible if it is open-loop adapted and square integrable, i.e. belongs to the sets Ux and Uy for
ordinary and tagged pedestrians respectively,
Ux :=
{
u : Ω× [0, T ]→ Ux ∣∣ u· is F-adapted, E [∫ T
0
|us|2ds
]
<∞
}
,
Uy :=
{
u : Ω× [0, T ]→ Uy ∣∣ u· is F-adapted, E [∫ T
0
|us|2ds
]
<∞
}
.
(2.4)
As a demonstration of how randomness effects the tagged model, consider the tagged dynamics
with Brownian small-scale interactions and a random terminal condition yT ∈ L2FT (Rd),{
dYt = (u
y
t +B
y
t )dt, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], uy· ∈ Uy,
YT = yT .
(2.5)
The naive solution Yt = yT −
∫ T
t (u
y
s +B
y
s )ds is not Ft-adapted, it depends on (Bys ; t ≤ s ≤ T )!
On the other hand,
Yt = E
[
yT −
∫ T
t
uys +B
y
sds | Ft
]
(2.6)
is Ft-adapted. If Yt from (2.6) is square-integrable for all t ∈ [0, T ], which it is in the current
setup, the Martingale Representation Theorem grants existence of a unique square-integrable
Rd×(wx+wy)-valued and Ft-adapted process Z· such that{
Yt −
∫ t
0 (u
y
s +B
y
s )ds =
∫ t
0 ZsdBs, ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
YT = yT .
(2.7)
Equation (2.7) constitutes a BSDE. The conditional expectation (2.6) can be interpreted as
the L2-projection of the tagged’s future path onto currently available information. Therefore, a
Aurell, Djehiche/Tagged pedestrian model 7
practical interpretation of Z· is that it is a supplementary control used by the tagged, to make
its path to yT the ’best prediction’ at any instant in time. From a modeling point of view, the
tagged pedestrian thus uses two control processes:
• uy· - to heed preferences on initial position, speed, congestion and more. It is the tagged’s
subjective best response to the environment.
• Z· - to predict the best path to yT given uy· . It is a square-integrable process, implicitly
given by the Martingale Representation Theorem.
Interaction between pedestrians at time t is introduced via the mean-field of ordinary pedes-
trians, L (Xt) := P ◦ (Xt)−1, and tagged pedestrians, L (Yt). They approximate the over-all
behavior of the crowds in the large population limit, under the assumption that within each
of the two groups individuals are indistinguishable (anonymous). This assumption is in place
throughout the paper. An example of a mean-field dependent preference is the following: to
safely accomplish its mission, a security team prefers that no individual deviates too far away
from the mean position of the team. Also, effects like congestion, the extra effort needed when
moving in a high density area, and aversion, repulsion from other pedestrians, can be captured
with distribution dependent coefficients.
In a random environment, with mean-field interactions, we formulate the dynamics of repre-
sentative group members (ordinary and tagged) in the model as
dYt = b
y(t,Θyt , Zt,Θ
x
t )dt+ ZtdBt,
dXt = b
x(t,Θyt , Zt,Θ
x
t )dt+ σ
x(t, θyt , Zt, θ
x
t )dB
x
t ,
YT = yT , X0 = x0,
(2.8)
where Θyt := (Yt,L (Yt) , uyt ), θyt := (Yt,L (Yt)) and
bx, by : Ω× [0, T ]× Rd × P(Rd)× Uy × Rd×(wx+wy) × Rd × P(Rd)× Ux → R,
σx : Ω× [0, T ]× Rd × P(Rd)× Rd×(wx+wy) × Rd × P(Rd)→ R.
(2.9)
Θxt and θ
x
t are defined correspondingly. Distribution-dependence makes (2.8) a so-called con-
trolled mean-field BFSDE. Appendix A summarizes results on existence of unique solutions
to mean-field BFSDEs and states assumptions strong enough so that there exists a unique
solution to (2.8) given any feasible control pair (ux· , u
y
· ) ∈ Ux × Uy. The assumptions are in
force throughout this paper.
Remark 2.1. Fundamental diagrams, that describe the marginal relations between speed,
density and flow in a crowd, are not necessary in the construction of bx and by, as functions
of crowd density. It is pointed out in [23] that the use of fundamental diagrams in pedestrian
crowd models is an artifact from road traffic models, without proper justification in the case
of two-dimensional flows. Instead, the more natural (for the purpose of modeling pedestrian
crowd motion) multidimensional velocity fields bx and by are used here.
2.2. Pedestrian preferences
Modeling pedestrian preferences is a delicate task. Not only is gathering of and calibration to
empirical data difficult for many reasons, but different setups lead to vastly different math-
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ematical formulations of rationality. The focus in this paper is on setups where pedestrian
groups are controlled by a central planner. Other possible setups are discussed in Section 4.
The ordinary and tagged pedestrians pay the cost fx and fy per time unit, respectively,
fx, fy : Ω× [0, T ]× Rd × P(Rd)× Uy × Rd×(wx+wy) × Rd × P(Rd)× Ux → R. (2.10)
On top of this, ordinary pedestrians pay a terminal cost hx at time T , and tagged pedestrians
pay an initial cost hy at time 0,
hx, hy : Ω× Rd × P(Rd)× Rd × P(Rd)→ R. (2.11)
Given a control feasible pair (ux· , u
y
· ) the total cost is Jx : Ux → R for the ordinary pedestrian,
and Jy : Uy → R for the tagged,
Jx(ux· ;u
y
· ) := E
[∫ T
0
fx(t,Θy, Zt,Θ
x
t )dt+ h
x(θyT , θ
x
T )
]
,
Jy(uy· ;u
x
· ) := E
[∫ T
0
fy(t,Θy, Zt,Θ
x
t )dt+ h
y(θy0 , θ
x
0 )
]
.
(2.12)
2.2.1. Mean-field type game
Consider the following situation. Within each crowd, pedestrians cooperate, but on a group-
level, the crowds compete. This constitutes a so-called mean-field type game between the crowds.
A Nash equilibrium in the game is a pair of feasible controls, (uˆx· , uˆ
y
· ) ∈ Ux×Uy, satisfying the
inequalities {
Jx(u·; uˆ
y
· ) ≥ Jx(uˆx· ; uˆy· ), ∀u· ∈ Ux,
Jy(u·; uˆx· ) ≥ Jy(uˆy· ; uˆx· ), ∀u· ∈ Uy.
(2.13)
The next result is a Pontryagin’s type stochastic maximum principle, and yields necessary and
sufficient conditions for any control pair satisfying (2.13). A proof is provided in Appendix C.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose that (uˆx· , uˆ
y
· ) is a Nash equilibrium, i.e. satisfies (2.13), and let the
regularity assumptions of Lemma C.1 be in force. Denote the corresponding state processes,
given by (2.8), by Xˆ· and (Yˆ·, Zˆ·) respectively. Let (pxx· , qxx· , q
xy
· ), p
xy
· , p
yy
· and (p
yx
· , q
yx
· , q
yy
· )
solve the adjoint equations
dpxxt = −
{
∂xHˆ
x
t + E
[
∗(∂µxHˆxt )
]}
dt+ qxxt dB
x
t + q
xy
t dB
y
t ,
dpxyt = −
{
∂yHˆ
x
t + E
[
∗(∂µyHˆxt
]}
dt− ∂zHˆxt dBt,
dpyyt = −
{
∂yHˆ
y
t + E
[
∗(∂µyHˆ
y
t )
]}
dt− ∂zHˆyt dBt,
dpyxt = −
{
∂xHˆ
y
t + E
[
∗(∂µxHˆ
y
t )
]}
dt+ qyxt dB
x
t + q
yy
t dB
y
t ,
pxxT = −
{
∂xhˆ
x + E
[
∗(∂µx hˆx)
]}
, pxy0 = 0,
pyy0 = ∂yhˆ
y + E
[
∗(∂µy hˆy)
]
, pyxT = 0,
(2.14)
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where H i, i ∈ {x, y}, is the Hamiltonian, defined by
H i(ω, t, y, µy, v, z, x, µx, u, pix, piy, qix) :=
∑
j∈{x,y}
bj(ω, t, y, µy, v, z, x, µx, u)pij
+σx(ω, t, y, µy, x, µx)qix − f i(ω, t, y, µy, v, z, x, µx, u).
(2.15)
Then
uˆxt = argmax
v∈Ux
Hx(t, Θˆyt , Zˆt, θˆ
x
t , v, p
xx
t , p
xy
t , q
xx
t ), a.e.-t, P-a.s.
uˆyt = argmax
v∈Uy
Hy(t, θˆyt , v, Zˆt, Θˆ
x
t , p
yx
t , p
yy
t , q
yx
t ), a.e.-t, P-a.s.
(2.16)
If furthermore H i is concave in (y, µy, v, z, x, µx, u), and hi is convex in (y, µy, x, µx, z), i ∈
{x, y}, then any feasible control pair satisfying (2.16) is a Nash equilibrium in the mean-field
type game.
Remark 2.2. Note that in the mean-field type game, the tagged can be thought of as a major
player, influencing the ordinary crowd. Furthermore, the central planner has access to a model
of the ordinary crowd and this is necessary for the determination of the equilibrium control.
2.2.2. Optimal control of mean-field type
If the central planner does not have access to a model of the crowd of ordinary pedestrians, any
interaction with the surrounding environment will then enter the tagged model as a random
signal. This is covered by the (ω, t)-dependence of by and fy. The mean-field type game then
reduces to a so-called optimal control problem of mean-field type,
min
uy· ∈Uy
E
[∫ T
0
fy(t,Θyt , Zt)dt+ h
y(θy0 , Z0)
]
,
s.t. dYt = b
y(t,Θyt , Zt)dt+ ZtdBt,
YT = yT .
(2.17)
Problem (2.17) is a special case of (2.13) and necessary and sufficient conditions follow as a
corollary to Theorem 2.1.
Corollary 2.1. Suppose that uˆy· solves (2.17) and denote the corresponding tagged state
(Yˆ·, Zˆ·). Let p· solve the adjoint equation
dpt = −
{
∂yH(t, Θˆyt , Zˆt, pt) + E
[
∗(∂µH(t, Θˆyt , Zˆt, pt)
]}
dt
− ∂zH(t, Θˆyt , Zˆt, pt)dBt,
p0 = ∂yh
y(θˆy0) + E
[
∗(∂µhy(θˆ
y
0)
]
,
(2.18)
where H is the Hamiltonian
H(ω, t, y, µ, v, z, p) := by(ω, t, y, µ, v, z)p− fy(t, y, µ, v, z). (2.19)
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Then
uˆyt = argmax
v∈Uy
H(t, θˆyt , v, Zˆt, pt), a.e.-t, P-a.s. (2.20)
If moreover H is concave in (y, µ, v, z) and that h is convex in (y, µ), then any feasible uˆy· that
satisfies (2.20), almost surely for a.e. t, is an optimal control to (2.17).
3. Simulations
This section is devoted to numerical simulations of the tagged model under various external
influences and internal preferences. First, two scenarios in the optimal control version of the
model are considered, including preferences on velocity, avoidance and interaction via the mean
position of the group. Secondly, asymmetric bidirectional flow is simulated with the full mean-
field type game version of the model. None of the parameters used in the simulations stem
from real world measurements, but velocity profiles and the asymmetric bidirectional flow are
compared qualitatively with the experimental studies [44] and [52].
3.1. Optimal control: keeping a tagged group together
In this scenario, the common goal of the tagged pedestrians is to stay close to the group mean,
while conserving energy and initiating in the proximity of y0 ∈ R2. Distance to the group mean
is one of the simplest mean-field effects that can be considered. Nonetheless it is a distribution-
dependent quantity, and the control problem characterizing tagged pedestrian behavior in this
scenario is the nonstandard optimization problem (3.1). The components of (3.1) are presented
in Table 1. There is no surrounding crowd present, only tagged pedestrians occupy the space.
min
u·∈U
1
2
E
[∫ T
0
(
λcont (u
y
t )
2
+ λattr (Yt − E[Yt])2
)
dt+ λinit(Y0 − y0)2
]
,
s.t. dYt = (u
y
t + λnoiseBt)dt+ ZtdBt,
YT = yT .
(3.1)
Velocity component Form
Internal velocity (control) uy· ∈ Uy
Acceleration noise λnoiseB
y
·
Preference (penalty) Form
Energy usage per unit time λcont (u
y
· )
2
Distance from group mean per unit time λattr (Y· − E[Y·])2
Distance from y0 ∈ R2 at t = 0 λinit(Y0 − y0)2
Table 1
Keeping a tagged group together: components
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The scenario is simulated for two sets of parameters, see Table 2. The mean-field BFSDE
system of equations characterizing optimal behavior, given by Corollary 2.1, is solved with
the least-square Monte Carlo method of [9]. The result is presented in Figure 1. The group
walks approximately on the straight line from the starting area to the target point. Remember
that the initial position of the tagged is chosen rationally by solving (3.1). There is a trade-off
between starting close to y0 and walking with high speed, and the groups rationally initiates
not at y0, but somewhere between y0 and yT . The group that prefers proximity to other group
members does indeed move in a more compact formation. The difference appears clearly when
looking at the mean distance-to-mean of the tagged group, see Figure 2.
λnoise λcont λattr λinit E[y0] yT T
Set 1 (with distance-to-mean penalty) 1 50 50 10 [0.1,0.1] [2,2] 1
Set 2 (without distance-to-mean penalty) 1 50 0 10 [0.1,0.1] [2,2] 1
Table 2
Keeping a tagged group together: parameter values. The preferred initial position is normally distributed around
[0.1, 0.1].
Fig 1. Top row: Crowd density evolution when λ2 = 50. Bottom row: Crowd density evolution when λ2 = 0.
3.2. Optimal control: desired velocity
Linear-quadratic scenarios have accessible closed form solutions by the method of matching.
We want to mention the case where the tagged’s goal is to move at its desired velocity vdes,
similar to what was originally introduced as the desired speed and direction in [29]. This is an
important special case, since desired velocity is measurable in live experiments. See for example
[44] for the speed profile of pedestrian walking in a straight corridor, starting from standing
Aurell, Djehiche/Tagged pedestrian model 12
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
time
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
Mean distance to group center
2  = 50
2  = 0
Fig 2. A tagged group acting under preferences with a distance-to-mean penalty indeed moves in a more compact
formation than a group that does not.
still. The scenario is formulated as standard optimal control problem, (3.2), and the setting is
summarized in Table 3.
min
u∈U [0,T ]
1
2
E
[∫ T
0
(
λcont (u
y
t )
2
+ λdes (u
y
t − vdes(t))2 + λrep(Yt −Q)2
)
dt
]
,
s.t. dYt = (u
y
t + λnoiseB
y
t )dt+ ZtdBt,
YT = yT .
(3.2)
Velocity component Form
Internal velocity (control) uy· ∈ Uy
Acceleration noise λnoiseB·
Preference Form
Energy usage per unit time λcont (u
y
· )
2
Uncomfortable velocity per unit time λdes (u
y
· − vdes(t))2
Distance from Q ∈ R2 per unit time λrep(Y· −Q)2
Table 3
Desired velocity: components
In view of Corollary 2.1, the optimal control is
uˆyt =
pt + λdesvdes(t)
λcont + λrep
, (3.3)
With the ansatz Yˆt = γ(t)pt + η(t)B
y
t + θt, γ(T ) = η(T ) = 0 and θ(T ) = yT , a matching
argument gives the optimally controlled dynamics up to a system of ODEs:
d
dtγ(t) = −λrepγ(t)2 + 1λcont+λdes , γ(T ) = 0,
d
dtη(t) = −λrepγ(t)η(t) + λnoise, η(T ) = 0,
d
dtθ(t) = −λrepγ(t)(θ(t)−Q) + λdesv des(t)λcont+λdes , θ(T ) = yT ,
Zˆt = η(t).
(3.4)
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In Figure 3, the simulated tagged crowd density is presented for two values of Q. The desired
velocity is set to be negative in both directions for t ∈ [0, T/2], and positive for t ∈ (T/2, T ],
which corresponds to a preference to first move south-west during the first half of the time
period and then turn around and move north-east. The parameter λrep is set to a negative
value, hence the tagged prefers to avoid Q. Parameters used in the simulation are summarized
in Table 4. The trade-off between walking in the desired velocity and walking close to the
diamond Q before reaching the target circle is clearly visible. Recall that the initial position
is determined by the optimization procedure. In this scenario, there is no preference on initial
position and the tagged group compensates for the location of Q by changing its initial position!
In [44] the average time-dependent velocity of a pedestrian initially standing still is measured
experimentally in the absence of interactions. The result is a relationship between speed and
time, than can be used as data for vdes. Approximating the graph presented in [44] with
vdes(t) = max{0.1, arctan(pit− 1.6)}, (3.5)
the scenario is simulated with the two presented in Table 5. The result is presented in Figure 4.
The parameter set with a higher penalty on from deviation from desired velocity naturally
results in a velocity profile closer to vdes(t).
λnoise λcont λdes λrep Q vdes(t) yT T
Set 1 0.5 0.5 1 -2 [−0.5,−0.5] sign (t− T
2
)
[3, 3] [0.1, 0.1] 1
Set 2 0.5 0.5 1 -2 [1.5, 1.5] sign
(
t− T
2
)
[3, 3] [0.1, 0.1] 1
Table 4
Desired velocity: parameter values.
Fig 3. Top row: Desired velocity with Set 1 parameters from Table 4. Bottom row: Desired velocity with Set
2 parameters from Table 4. The tagged crowd moves first south-west and then north-east, following its desired
velocity, while avoiding the diamond on its way to the circle.
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λnoise λcont λdes λrep Q vdes(t) yT T
Set 3 0.1 0.5 2 0 [0, 0] Eq. (3.5) [0, 0] 4
Set 4 0.1 0.5 10 0 [0, 0] Eq. (3.5) [0, 0] 4
Table 5
Desired velocity: parameter values.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
0
0.5
1
1.5
Mean velocity
Desired velocity
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
0
0.5
1
1.5
Mean velocity
Desired velocity
Fig 4. Left: Desired velocity with Set 3 parameters from Table 5. Right: Desired velocity with Set 4 from Table 5.
The mean velocity measured in the scenario (3.2) compared to the desired velocity (3.5).
3.3. Mean-field type game: asymmetric bidirectional flow
Consider now a scenario where ordinary pedestrians initiate at x0 ∈ R2, close yT ∈ R2, the
location of an incident. They begin to walk towards the safe spot xT ∈ R2. A tagged pedestrian
is to end up at the location of the incident yT at time t = T . The tagged pedestrian is repelled
by the mean of the ordinary pedestrian crowd, while the ordinary pedestrian crowd is repelled
by the tagged pedestrian. This scenario is implemented as the MFTG (3.6), summarized in
Table 6.
Jx(ux· ;u
y
· ) = 12E
[∫ T
0
(
λxcont (u
x
t )
2 + λxrep(Xt − Yt)2
)
dt+ λxterm(XT − xT )2
]
,
dXt = u
x
t dt+ σdB
x
t , σ ∈ R, X0 = x0,
Jy(uy· ;ux· ) =
1
2E
[∫ T
0
(
λycont (u
y
t )
2
+ λyred(Yt − E[Xt])2
)
dt+ λyinit(Y0 − y0)2
]
,
dYt =
(
uyt + λ
y
noisedB
y
t
)
+ ZtdBt.
(3.6)
In Figure 5 and Figure 6 the scenario is simulated for the parameter sets presented in Table 7.
In Figure 5, the ordinary and the tagged do not have to cross paths to go from their initial
to their terminal positions. The simulated paths (top plot of Figure 5) are similar in shape
to both the outcome of the corridor experiment under ’condition 3’ (no obstacle) of [44] and
the BFR-SSL experiment of [52]. These experimental studies were conducted in a controlled
environment that is outside the tagged model presented in this paper. Anyhow, the tagged
Aurell, Djehiche/Tagged pedestrian model 15
ORDINARY PEDESTRIAN TAGGED PEDESTRIAN
Velocity component Form Velocity component Form
Internal velocity (control) ux· ∈ Ux Internal velocity (control) uy· ∈ Uy
Diffusion noise level σ Acceleration noise λynoiseB
y
·
Preference Form Preference Form
Energy usage per unit time λxcont (u
x
· )
2 Energy usage per unit time λycont (u
y
· )
2
Repulsion per unit time λxrep(X· − Y·)2 Repulsion per unit time λyrep(Y· − E[X·])2
Proximity to xT at t = T λ
x
term(XT − xT )2 Proximity to y0 at t = 0 λyinit(Y0 − y0)2
Table 6
Asymmetric bidirectional flow: components
model replicates the separation of lanes in a bidirectional pedestrian flow and the uncertainty
that pedestrian motion exhibits. In the density snapshots (bottom row of Figure 5) reveal that
in simulated scenario, the tagged tagged moves in almost constant velocity towards yT , while
the ordinary group lingers a while at x0 before it starts to move towards xT . In Figure 6, the
tagged’s and the ordinary’s straight path from initiate position to target cross each other. In
this scenario, the ordinary pedestrians resolve this by taking walking in a half-circle around
the tagged, before moving towards their preferred terminal position xT .
TAGGED PEDESTRIAN λynoise λ
y
cont λ
y
rep λ
y
init y0 E[yT ] T
Bidirectional flow 0.7 1 -2 3 [0,1] [10,0] 1
Twist 0.7 1 -1 3 [0,-3] [10,-1] 1
ORDINARY PEDESTRIAN σ λxcont λ
x
rep λ
x
end E[x0] xT T
Bidirectional flow 0.7 1 -1 10 [10,-1] [0,0] 1
Twist 0.7 1 -1.7 10 [10,-2] [0,0] 1
Table 7
Asymmetric bidirectional flow: parameters values. The initial and terminal constraints are normally
distribution with mean tabled above, and standard deviation 0.3 and 0.1 for the tagged and ordinary pedestrian,
respectively.
4. Concluding remarks and research perspectives
A mean-field type game model for so-called tagged pedestrian motion has been presented and
the reliability of the model has been studied through simulations. To perform simulations,
necessary and sufficient conditions for a Nash equilibrium are provided in Theorem 2.1. The
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Fig 5. Top row: Pedestrian paths for parameter set ’Bidirectional flow’ from Table 7. Bottom row: Pedestrian
density for parameter set ’Bidirectional flow’ from Table 7.
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Fig 6. Top row: Pedestrian paths with parameter set ’Twist’ from Table 7. Bottom row: Pedestrian density with
parameter set ’Twist’ from Table 7.
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theorem is proven under quite restrictive conditions on involved coefficient functions. However,
necessary conditions for a Nash equilibrium in similar games are available under less restrictive
conditions and since our proof follows a standard path, the conditions can certainly be relaxed.
The model captures both game-like and minor agent-type scenarios. In the latter, the tagged
cannot effect crowd movement while in the former, the tagged and the surrounding crowd have
conflicting interests, interact, and compete. The rational pedestrian behavior in the competa-
tive game-like scenario is to use an equilibrium strategy.
There are many variations to the mean-field type game approach. The scenarios that have
been considered in this paper fall into two rather extreme categories; our pedestrians have
acted under either basic or optimal rationality, in the terms of [22]. When pedestrians neither
have access to information about their surroundings or the ability to anticipate pedestrian
behavior, the best they can do is to implement a control policy based on their own position
and target position. This is a basic level of rationality. If the full model is available and pedes-
trians cooperate, they can implement a control policy of optimal rationality. If the tagged can
observe crowd densities at each instant in time but not anticipate future movement, dynamic
pedestrian preference may be modeled as a set of control problems: for each τ ∈ [0, T ],
min
uy. (τ)∈Uyτ
E
[∫ T
τ
fy(t, Yt,L (Yτ ) , uyt (τ))dt+ I{τ = 0}hy(Y0,L (Y0))
]
,
s.t. dYt = b
y(t, Yt,L (Yτ ) , Zt, uyt (τ))dt+ ZtdBt,
YT = yT ,
(4.1)
where Uyτ is defined in the same way as Uy, but with the interval [0, T ] replaced by [τ, T ],
cf. (2.4). This is an intermediate level between basic and optimal rationality. Pedestrian de-
cision making can also be modeled as a decentralized mechanism, i.e. instead of cooperating,
pedestrians compete in a game-like manner within the crowd. Decentralized crowd formation
can be modeled by a MFG:
(i) Fix a deterministic function µ· : [0, T ]→ P2(Rd).
(ii) Solve the stochastic control problem
min
uy· ∈Uy
E
[∫ T
0
fy(t, Yt, µt, u
y
t )dt+ h
y(Y0, µ0)
]
,
s.t. dYt = b(t, Yt, µt, Zt, u
y
t )dt+ ZtdBt,
YT = yT .
(4.2)
(iii) Determine the function µˆ· : [0, T ] → P2(Rd) such that µˆt is the law of the optimally
controlled state from Step (ii) at time t.
Furthermore, minimal exit time (evacuation) problems can be posed at all levels of rationality.
The numerical simulation of mean-field BFSDE systems is in this paper done either with the
least-square Monte Carlo method of [8], or by reducing them to a system of ODEs by the
method of matching. The downside with the least-square Monte Carlo method is that it is not
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clear which basis functions to use and the matching method is feasible only for linear quadratic
problems. Other simulation approaches include deep learning [49] and fixed-point schemes [24].
Fast and stable numerical solvers for mean-field BFSDEs beyond the linear-quadratic case is
an area of research that would benefit many applied fields. In pedestrian crowd modeling,
improved solvers would facilitate simulation when effects like congestion, crowd aversion, and
anisotropic preferences are present.
Appendix A: Mean-field BFSDE
Given a control pair (ux· , u
y
· ) ∈ Ux × Uy, systems of the form (2.8) have been studied in the
context of optimal control of mean-field type, where they naturally arise as necessary optimality
conditions. This appendix summarizes some of the results on existence and uniqueness of
solutions to MF-BFSDEs. Let
H2,d :=
{
V· Rd-valued and prog. meas. : E
[∫ T
0
|Vs|2ds
]
<∞
}
S2,d :=
{
V· Rd-valued and prog.meas. : E
[
sup
s∈[0,T ]
|Vs|2
]
<∞
} (A.1)
and recall that, in the case of a fixed control pair, bx and by are functions of
(ω, t, y, µy, z, x, µx) ∈ Ω× [0, T ]× Rd × P2(Rd)× Rd×(wx+wy) × Rd × P(Rd) (A.2)
and σx is a function of
(ω, y, µy, z, x, µx) ∈ Ω× Rd × P2(Rd)× Rd×(wx+wy) × Rd × P(Rd). (A.3)
A.1. Quadratic-type constraints
For t ∈ [0, T ], µy, µx ∈ P2(Rd), x, x¯, y, y¯ ∈ Rd and z, z¯ ∈ Rd×(wx+wy), let
A(t, y, y¯, µy, v, z, z¯, x, x¯, µx)
= (by(t, y, µy, v, z, x, µx)− by(t, y¯, µy, v, z¯, x¯, µx)) · (y − y¯)
+ (bx(t, y, µy, v, z, x, µx)− bx(t, y¯, µy, v, z¯, x¯, µx)) · (x− x¯)
+ (σx(t, y, µy, z, x, µx)− σx(t, y¯, µy, z¯, x¯, µx)) · (z − z¯).
(A.4)
In [24], the authors provide conditions on A under which, alongside standard assumptions,
(2.8) has a unique solution (X·, Y·, Z·) in H2,d ×H2,d ×H2,d×(wx+wy) for all T .
A.2. Small time constraint
Under standard Lipschitz- and linear growth-conditions and for a non-degenerate diffusion σx,
(2.8) has a unique solution (X·, Y·, Z·) ∈ S2,d × S2,d × H2,d×(wx+wy) for small enough T [19].
The bound on T depends on the Lipschitz coefficients. In [19], the authors provide an example
where uniqueness fails.
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Appendix B: Differentiation of measure-valued functions
The differentiation of measure-valued functions is handled with the lifting technique, introduced
by P.-L. Lions and outlined in for example [18, 11, 19]. Assume that the underlying probability
space is rich enough, so that for every µ ∈ P2(Rd) there is a random variable Y ∈ L2F (Ω;Rd)
such that L (Y ) = µ. A probability space with this property is ([0, 1],B([0, 1]), dx). Under
this assumption, any function f : P2(Rd) → R induces a function F : L2(Rd) → R so that
F (Y ) := f(L (Y )). The Fre´chet derivative of F at Y , whenever it exists, is the continuous
linear functional DF [Y ] that satisfies
F (Y ′)− F (Y ) = E [DF [Y ] · (Y ′ − Y )]+ o(‖Y ′ − Y ‖2), ∀Y ′ ∈ L2F (Ω;Rd). (B.1)
Riesz’ Representation Theorem yields uniqueness of DF [Y ]. Furthermore, there exists a Borel
function ϕ[µ] : Rd → Rd, independent of the version of Y , such that DF [Y ] = ϕ[L (Y )](Y )
[18]. Therefore
f(L (Y ′))− f(L (Y )) = E [ϕ[Y ](Y )(Y ′ − Y )]+ o(‖Y ′ − Y ‖), ∀Y ′ ∈ L2F (Ω;Rd). (B.2)
Denote ∂µf(µ;x) := ϕ[µ](x), x ∈ Rd, and ∂µf(L (()Y );Y ) =: ∂µf(L (()Y )). The following
identity characterizes derivatives with respect to elements in P2(Rd),
DF [Y ] = ϕ[L (Y )](Y ) = ∂µf(L (Y )). (B.3)
Equation (B.2) is the Taylor approximation of a measure-valued function. Consider now an f
that besides the measure takes another argument, ξ. Then
f(ξ,L (Y ′))− f(ξ,L (Y )) = E [∂µf(ξ˜,L (Y ) ;Y )(Y ′ − Y )]+ o(‖Y − Y ′‖2), (B.4)
where the expectation is taken over non-tilded random variables. This is abbreviated as
E
[
∂µf(ξ˜,L (Y ) ;Y )(Y ′ − Y )
]
=: E
[
(∂µf(ξ,L (Y )))∗(Y ′ − Y )
]
. (B.5)
Note that L (Y ) is deterministic, so the expectation is only taken over the ’directional argument’
of ∂µf , Y . Also, the expected value (B.5) is stochastic, since it is not taken over ξ. Taking
another expectation and changing the order of integration yields
E
[
E˜
[
∂µf(ξ˜,L (Y ) ;Y )
]
(Y ′ − Y )
]
, (B.6)
where the tilded expectation is taken over tilded random variables. This is abbreviated as
E˜
[
∂µf(ξ˜,L (Y ) ;Y )
]
=: E [∗(∂µf(ξ,L (Y )))] (B.7)
Example from Section 3.1 The following measure derivative appears in Section 3.1,
E
[
∗
(
∂µ
(
Yt −
∫
R2
yL (Yt) (dy)
)2)]
. (B.8)
Note that
(
Yt −
∫
R2 yL (Yt) (dy)
)2
= (Yt − E [M ])2 =: F (M) where M is a random variable
with probability law L (Yt). By the Taylor expansion, DF [M ] = 2(Yt − E [M ]) and therefore
E
[
∗
(
∂µ
(
Yt −
∫
R2
yL (Yt) (dy)
)2)]
= E [2(Yt − E [M ])] = 0. (B.9)
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Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 2.1
Let u¯x,· be a spike variation of uˆx· ,
u¯x,t :=
{
uˆxt , t ∈ [0, T ]\E,
ut, t ∈ E,
(C.1)
where u· ∈ Ux and E is a subset of [0, T ] of measure . Given the control pair (u¯x,· , uˆy· ), denote
the corresponding solution to the state equation (2.8) by X¯· and (Y¯ · , Z¯· ). To ease notation,
let for ϑ ∈ {bx, by, σx, fx, fy, hx, hy},
ϑ¯t := ϑ(t, θ¯
y,
t , uˆ
y
t , Z¯

t , Θ¯
x,
t ), ϑˆ

t := ϑ(t, Θˆ
y
t , Zˆt, Θˆ
x
t ), δxϑ(t) := ϑ(t, Θˆ
y
t , Zˆt, θˆ
x
t , u¯
x,
t )− ϑˆt. (C.2)
Consider the ordinary pedestrian’s potential loss, would she switch from the equilibrium control
uˆx· to the perturbed u¯
x,
· ,
Jx(u¯x,· ; uˆ
y
· )− J(uˆx· ; uˆy· ) = E
[∫ T
0
(
f¯x,t − fˆxt
)
dt+ h¯x,T − hˆxT
]
. (C.3)
A Taylor expansion of the terminal cost difference yields
E
[
h¯x,T − hˆxT
]
= E
[(
∂yhˆ
x
t + E[∗(∂µhˆxT )]
)(
X¯t − Xˆt
)]
+ o
(
‖X¯T − XˆT ‖2
)
, (C.4)
Let X˜x· and (Y˜ x· , Z˜x· ) be the first order variation processes, solving the linear BFSDE system
dX˜xt =
{(
∂y bˆ
x
t + E[∗(∂µy bˆxt )]
)
Y˜ xt + ∂z bˆ
x
t Z˜
x
t +
(
∂xbˆ
x
t + E[∗(∂µx bˆxt )]
)
X˜xt
+ δxb
x(t)1E(t)
}
dt
+
{
(∂yσˆ
x
t + E[∗(∂µy σˆxt )]) Y˜ xt + ∂zσˆxt Z˜xt + (∂xσˆxt + E[∗(∂µx σˆxt )]) X˜xt
}
dBxt ,
dY˜ xt =
{(
∂y bˆ
y
t + E[
∗(∂µy bˆ
y
t )]
)
Y˜ xt + ∂z bˆ
y
t Z˜
x
t +
(
∂xbˆ
y
t + E[
∗(∂µx bˆ
y
t )]
)
X˜xt
+ δxb
y(t)1E(t)
}
dt+ Z˜xt dBt,
X˜x0 = 0, Y˜
x
T = 0.
(C.5)
Lemma C.1. Assume that bx are by are Lipschitz in the controls, that bx, by, fx, fy and σx are
differentiable at the equilibrium point almost surely for all t, that their derivatives are bounded
almost surely for all t and that
∂xhˆ
x + E
[
∗(∂µx hˆx)
]
∈ L2FT (Rd), ∂yhˆy + E
[
∗(∂µy hˆy)
]
∈ L2F0(Rd). (C.6)
Then for some positive constant C,
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
|X˜xt |2 + |Y˜ xt |2 +
∫ t
0
‖Z˜xs ‖F ds
]
≤ C2.
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
|X¯t − Xˆt − X˜xt |2 + |Y¯ t − Yˆt − Y˜ xt |2 +
∫ t
0
‖Z¯s − Zˆs − Z˜xs ‖F ds
]
≤ C2.
(C.7)
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Proof. The proof is a combination of standard estimates, see [51] for the SDE terms and [4]
for the BSDE terms.
The adjoint processes and the Hamiltonian, defined in (2.14) and (2.15) respectively, yield
together with Lemma C.1 and integration by parts that
Jx(u¯x,· ; uˆ
y
· )− J(uˆx· ; uˆy· ) = E
[∫ T
0
{(
b¯x,t − bˆxt
)
pxxt +
(
b¯y,t − bˆyt
)
pxyt
+ (σ¯x,t − σˆxt ) qxxt −
(
H¯x,t − Hˆxt
)}
dt− pxxT X˜xT
]
+ o()
= E
[∫ T
0
{(
b¯x,t − bˆxt
)
pxxt +
(
b¯y,t − bˆyt
)
pxyt + (σ¯
x,
t − σˆxt ) qxxt −
(
H¯x,t − Hˆxt
)}
dt
−
∫ T
0
X˜xt dp
xx
t −
∫ T
0
pxxt dX˜
x
t −
∫ T
0
d〈pxx· , X˜x· 〉t
−
∫ T
0
Y˜ xt dp
xy
t −
∫ T
0
pxyt dY˜
x
t −
∫ T
0
d〈pxy· , Y˜ x· 〉t
]
+ o()
= −E
[∫ T
0
δxH
x(t)1E(t)dt
]
+ o(),
(C.8)
where H¯x,t , Hˆ
x
t and δxH
x(t) are defined in line with (C.2). The final equality is retrieved by
expanding all differences on the third row of (C.8), canceling all but δxH
x(t)1E(t) with the
forth and fifth row, while making use of the estimates from Lemma C.1.
Consider now a spike variation of the tagged’s control,
uˇy,t :=
{
uˆyt , t ∈ [0, T ]\E,
ut, t ∈ E,
(C.9)
where u· ∈ Uy. Following the same lines of calculations as above, one finds that if pyx· , pyy· are
given by the adjoint equations (2.14) and the Hamiltonian Hy by (2.15), then
Jy(uˇy,· ; uˆ
x
· )− Jy(uˆy· ; uˆx· ) = −E
[∫ T
0
δyH
y(t)1Edt
]
+ o(), (C.10)
where δyH
y(t) is defined in line with (C.2), for the spike perturbation uˇy,t . The rest of the
proof is standard, and can be found in for example [51].
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